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Abstract
We show that a market access requirement (MAR) can increase
competition and reduce prices if a properly designed subsidy scheme
is used to enforce the requirement. This is in contrast to most of the
recent literature which has generally concluded that MARs are unambiguously anticompetitive. Our analysis underscores the importance
of proper targeting and shows that it is sensitive to the composition
of firms within an industry.
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Introduction

Strongly debated for over a decade, results-oriented trade policies such as
export targets or market access requirements (MARs) continue to be viewed
with skepticism. Verdier's (1998) recent survey of results-oriented versus
rules-oriented policies paints a clear picture as to why. Despite their apparent political popularity and use in Japanese-US trade relations, the academic
literature is primarily negative, either showing MARs to be anticompetitive
or that, given a choice, the importing country government would prefer a
rules-oriented policy because of verification aspects of a MAR.l Two exceptions, Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Krishna et al (1997) show that
MARs in intermediate goods markets can be procompetitive when related
final goods markets are considered. Krishna and Morgan (1998) consider an
imperfectly competitive model in which the MAR is enforced by the threat
of a tariff in the final goods market, while Krishna et al (1997) consider perfectly competitive markets where a MAR on the intermediate good is shown
to lower marginal cost in the final goods market. In this paper, we examine the possibility of procompetitive MARs in the absence of related market
effects.
We focus on a MAR in which an importing country, say, Japan, 'voluntarily' agrees to guarantee a certain minimum share of its home market for a
final good exported from a particular country, say, the US, and we show that
such a MAR can increase competition and reduce prices if a properly designed contingent subsidy scheme is used to enforce the requirement. While
there are a number of other instruments that could be used (and were by the
Japanese authorities in the Semiconductor Agreement), we consider subsidies because they are feasible in a wide range of environments where direct
control is not. 2 Additionally, we focus on the least cost subsidies that enforce
the MAR.
Formally, in a one-period Cournot model with multiple Japanese and US
firms, we analyze a subsidy scheme in which each targeted firm receives a
monetary reward proportional to its individual share of the market if the
1 See, for example, Krishna et al (1998), Verdier (1997), Greaney (1996), Greaney
(1997), Ethier and Horn (1996), Cronshaw and Markusen (1995), Dumler (1996), Irwin
(1994), among others.
2 As noted by Greaney (1996), the Japanese government had no legal authority to
restrict Japanese sales, so that MITI had to rely on "moral suasion" or the use of financial
instruments to provide incentives for firms to meet the target.
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market access requirement is met. J Three different targeting schemes are
considered: (i) contingent subsidies for US firms, (ii) contingent subsidies
for Japanese firms, and, (iii) contingent subsidies for both US and Japanese
firms. In all three scenarios, the Japanese government moves first in announcing total expenditure for the subsidy scheme. Using numerical calculations,
for different industry compositions, we pick the least cost policy that enforces
the MAR and determine whether or not aggregate output increases relative
to free trade. We show that when the number of US firms is much smaller
than the number of Japanese firms, the least cost subsidy - targeting only
the US firms - is procompetitive. However, when the number of US firms
is much greater than the number of Japanese firms, the least cost subsidy
- targeting only the Japanese firms - is anticompetitive. When the US and
Japanese industries are of similar size, the least cost subsidy - targeting both
US and Japanese firms - is procompetitive if the number of US firms is no
smaller than the number of Japanese firms, but is anticompetitive otherwise.
The intuition behind our results is best seen in the case of two firmsone Japanese and one US. A contingent subsidy, offered only to the US firm
in the event the market share target is met, creates an incentive for the
US firm to expand output. Since the paYment is made only after market
clearing, the Japanese firm's best response is unchanged. With strategic
substitutes and stability, the equilibrium involves higher aggregate output as
US output increases and Japanese output decreases less than proportionately.
In contrast, if the Japanese firm is targeted, it will decrease output to avail
itself of the subsidy, but the US best response is unaffected. In equilibrium,
US output increases less than proportionately so that total output falls and
price rises. In this simple case, procompetitive targeting involves subsidizing
only the US firm. With more firms or other targeting schemes, the analysis
is more complicated, but the basic idea is that with a subsidy targeted to
the right set of firms the MAR can be met in a procompetitive manner.
These results are in stark contrast to other studies that examine MARs
in the context of a single market. Consider, for example, Krishna et al
JIn general, it is well understood (see Sen, 1966) that share based subsidy schemes are
more high powered than specific subsidies. The reason is that raising one's own output
not only raises one's own share, but has a negative externality on that obtained by others,
ceteris paribus. Sen pointed this out in the context of the work points system used in
Communist China where workers were awarded work points for their effort and the share
of output they obtained was equal to their share of the total work points. In this paper,
however, it makes no difference whether the contingent subsidy is share based or specific.
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(1998) which also examines the use of subsidies to enforce market access
requirements. Key differences in the two approaches are that in the former
study (i) subsidIes are triggered, not when the MAR is met (as in this paper),
but when the market share constraint is violated and (ii) the government
moves last so that the level of the subsidy is determined only after firms make
their strategic choices, i.e., the subsidy is determined after firms announce
their strategic choices but before the market clears. This timing is shown
to create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices in the targeted market.
. The intuition is that the US firm has an incentive to trigger a subsidy for itself
by raising price and lowering its sales such that the market share target is
violated. On the other hand, the Japanese firm is strategically motivated to
increase its price in order to reduce its market share and prevent the subsidy
from being conferred on the US product.
Most other analyses of MARs rely on financial penalties to enforce the
access requirement. The most straightforward of these is the duopoly model
of Greaney (1996) where the Japanese government moves first and threatens
its domestic firm with a preannounced harsh financial penalty in the event
that the market share target is not met. 4 In this case, the Japanese firm
has a strategic incentive to raise price in order to lower its sales and prevent
the penalty from being triggered. The strategic behavior of the US firm is
not affected by the penalty threat since the threat is enforced only after the
market clears and profits have been earned. However, since the firms are
competing in strategic complements, the US firm matches its rival's price increases and, in equilibrium, both prices are higher compared to free trade. By
adopting the same timing structure as Greaney (1996), we are able to show
that the use of contingent subsidies with proper targeting can, in contrast to
the common perception of MARs, be procompetitive.
4 Her analysis does consider subsidies but as an alternative to a market access requirement or VIE (enforced by a penalty threat). She finds the two instruments have opposite
effects on price, with the VIE raising prices. In contrast, Krishna et al (1998) emphasize
the potential use of a subsidy to enforce a VIE and show that if the subsidy is triggered by
a violation of the market share target, firms with market power will have an incentive to
raise price. Greaney (1997) focuses on VIEs in the context of a model with buyer switching costs and shows an import subsidy used to offset these switching costs can enhance
competition. There are usually several different ways of implementing a MAR and the
effects of the requirement depend critically on the details of the enforcement mechanism.
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Model

We consider m Japanese firms and n US firms competing in quantities in
a specific Japanese market. Let Japanese firm i's output be denoted by Xi
and let Yj represent the output of US firm j. We devise a subsidy scheme
based on individual market shares in each of three scenarios. In the first,
only US firms are targeted for the subsidy while in the second, only Japanese
firms are offered the subsidy. Finally, we look at the case where both US and
Japanese firms are given the subsidy incentives.
The structure of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the government
announces that each targeted firm will receive part of a given subsidy outlay
S equal to its individual share of the market only if the aggregate US market
share meets the minimum level specified by the MAR. For instance, when
only US firms are offered a subsidy if the target is met, US firm j receives

('2!~

Yj )

S over and above its ordinary profit. The firms then simultaneously

and noncooperatively choose outputs in the second stage after which the
market clears and the government pays out the pre-announced subsidies only
if the market share target is met.
We assume a twice continuously differentiable inverse demand function
P(X) that is downward sloping, pi (.) < 0, and strictly concave, p" (.) < 0,
whenever positive. We also assume each firm has a constant marginal cost
of production c. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria.
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Subsidy policy with only US firms targeted

First, we consider a market share subsidy that is offered only to the US firms.

3.1

US firm's best response

Consider US firm k's optimal choice. Its profit without the subsidy, i.e., its
ordinary profit is
m

n

7rk(') = [P(LXi
i=l

+ LYj) j=l

4

C]Yk

(1)

while its profit with the market share subsidy is

(2)
Clearly, 7rk(') lies everywhere above 7rk(')' It can be verified that 7rk(') is
concave and, for n ;::: 2, has a maximizer Ed.) that is greater than E k (.), the
maximizer of 7rk(.).5
Now, consider the constraint that must be met in order for firm k to
receive the subsidy, namely,

(3)
Rearranging, we see that firm k gets the subsidy only if Yk ;::: l~Q I:: 1Xi I:j:Fk Yj· Denote 9k(') as the minimum amount that firm k has to produce to
trigger the subsidy, i.e.,

(4)
Then, k's overall profit function is given by

(5)
Depending on rival outputs, three possible cases, as depicted in Figures lea),
1(b) and 1(c), respectively, may arise. The overall profit function is depicted
by the bold curve in all three figures. Let Ek (.) denote firm k's overall best
response. In the first case, the output that maximizes 7rk(') exceeds the
minimum output needed to meet the constraint (9k(') ::; E k(.)) and, clearly,
firm k is best off choosing Ek(.) = B k(.). In the second case, 9k(') > E k(.)
and it is optimal to produce just enough so as to satisfy the market share
target and earn a subsidy, i.e.. , Ek (.) = 9k(') is optimal. Finally, we may
have the situation depicted in the third case where the US firm is best off
ignoring the temptation of the subsidy and producing along its ordinary best
response, i.e., Ek (.) = E k (.).
5When n = 1, 7rk(') = 'lrk(.) +$ and the maximizer of the US firm's profit with subsidy
is identical its ordinary profit maximizer, i.e., B k (.) = B k (.).
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The nature of a US firm's best response can be better grasped by considering the duopoly case (i.e., m = 1, n = 1) as depicted in Figure 2. B 1 (.)
and B 2 (.) are the Japanese and US firms' ordinary Cournot best responses,
respectively, while B 2 (.) depicts the maximizer of the US firm's profit with
the subsidy. The market share constraint line OM is shown to lie above
and to the left of the free trade point F since the constraint is assumed to
be binding under free trade. Then, the· US firm's overall best response is
depicted by the bold curve. For small Japanese outputs, the overall best
response lies along B 2 (.) until the point H where B 2 (.) intersects the market
share line OM. For Japanese outputs greater than this level, the US firm
switches to producing along the market share line. This continues until point
I is reached, whereupon, the US firm's overall best response jumps down to
point J on its ordinary best response. Note that for x = J1> the US firm
is indifferent between producing its Cournot output and between producing
the minimum output necessary to earn the subsidy. Further, it can be shown
that this jump point J 1 , is increasing in S.
It should be noted that, as indicated in footnote 5, unlike the general
case, the US firm's profit with the subsidy simply equals its ordinary profit
plus a constant S. Thus, for this special case, B 2 (.), the maximizer of the
US firm's profit with the subsidy coincides with B 2 (.). However, in general,
B 2 (.) always exceeds B 2 (.).

3.2

Equilibrium

As long as only US firms are targeted, the market share subsidy does not
affect the Japanese firms strategically and so they continue to produce along
their ordinary Cournot best responses. Now, suppose the government picks
the smallest S that supports a pure strategy Nash equilibrium satisfying the
market share target. Again, referring to the duopoly case for expositional
ease, the minimum S is chosen so as to make E 1 in Figure 2 the Japanese
output at which the US firm is indifferent between meeting the constraint
(by producing at E) and ignoring it (by producing at G on its Cournot best
response). Clearly, such an S yields an equilibrium at E that not only satisfies
the market access requirement but also yields an aggregate output greater
than that under free trade. Hence, implementing a MAR by targeting only
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the US firm is procompetitive in the duopoly caseY This result is robust
to the number of firms as well as the composition of firms. The intuition
for the procompetitive outcome is that the market share subsidy gives an
incentive to the US firms to expand their output. This results in a less than
proportionate contraction of Japanese output (strategic substitutes) such
that aggregate output increases.

4

Subsidy policy with only Japanese firms
targeted

Suppose the subsidy incentives were offered to only the Japanese firms.

4.1

Japanese firm's best response

Consider Japanese firm l's optimal choice. Its ordinary profit is
m

n

?TI(.) = [P(2: Xi
i=l

+ 2: Yj)

-

C]Xt

(6)

j=l

while its profit with the market share subsidy is
(7)

As before, subsidy-ridden profit 1r1(.) lies everywhere above 71"1(.), is concave,
and, for m ~ 1, B I (.) is greater than B I (.).
Now, consider the constraint that must be met in order for Japanese firm
I to receive the subsidy. Firm I gets the subsidy only if XI :S l~a 2:7=1 Yj 2:i#1 Xi· Denote h l (.) as the maximum amount that firm I can produce and
still get the subsidy, i.e.,
(8)
UWhile Figure 2 has been drawn for the case of linear demand, the result holds as
long as the slopes of the Cournot best responses lie between -1 and 0 (guaranteed by our
assumptions on demand and cost).
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Then, for any rival outputs, l's overall profit function is given by

(9)
Again, we have three cases, as depicted in Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c). In
the first case h/(.) 2 B/(.) and clearly 13/(.) = B/(.). In the second case,
it produces just enough so as to satisfy the VIE target and earn a subsidy
while in the third case, the Japanese firm is best off ignoring the subsidy and
producing along its ordinary best response, i.e., 13/(.) = B/(.).
As before, for expositional ease, consider the Japanese firm's overall best
response in the duopoly case shown in Figure 4. For small US outputs, the
Japanese firm produces along its Cournot best response B 1 ( .) until the point
K where it jumps down to producing along the market share line OM. This
is optimal up to point N after which the Japanese firm switches to producing
the output B 1 (.) that maximizes its subsidy profit7. Note that the Japanese
firm is indifferent between producing at L and K when the US firm produces
the corresponding output level K 1 .

4.2

Equilibrium

In this case, the US firms' strategic behavior is unaffected by the subsidy.
For the duopoly case shown in Figure 4, the smallest S that supports a Nash
equilibrium satisfying the MAR is the S that makes the Japanese firm indifferent between points T and R when the US firm produces the corresponding
output level T 1 • This subsidy outlay yields an equilibrium at T that is associated with a lower aggregate output and higher price compared to the free
trade point F. Hence, implementing a MAR by targeting only the Japanese
firm is anticompetitive in the duopoly case. This result can be shown to be
robust to the number of firms as well as the composition of firms. Here, the
promise of the subsidy provides an incentive for the Japanese firms to cut
back on output. This, in turn, is associated with a less than proportionate
increase in the output of US firms such that aggregate output decreases and
price increases.
7Recall that in this special case with only one firm being targeted, B 1 (.) coincides with

B 1 (.).
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5

Subsidy policy with both US and Japanese
firms targeted

Now, we consider the case where
subsidy incentives.

5.1

bo~h

US and Japanese firms are offered

US and Japanese firms' best responses

In this scenario, US firm k's profit with the market share subsidy is ITkC,) =
1rkC,) + [Yk/C2::'l Xi + 2:j=l Yj)]S and the subsidy profit for Japanese firm lis
given by IT/C.) = 1rL(.) + [xL/C2::'l Xi + 2:j=l Yj)]S, Though these expressions
are different from those in the previous two sections, the analysis is analogous
and the best responses are qualitatively similar. However, the overall best
responses for the duopoly case differ from the previous two targeting regimes
since the best response when the subsidy is earned differs from that when
it is not earned so that B =1= f3. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the US and
Japanese firm's best responses, respectively, under this policy.

5.2

Equilibrium

For the duopoly case, the smallest S that supports a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium satisfying the market share target is given by that S for which the
two overall best responses just touch each other along the market share line
before jumping to their respective Cournot responses. This is shown in Figure
7 where the equilibrium must lie at some point along the segment H N on
the market share line. The analysis is similar to that in Krishna and Morgan
(1997) and the interested reader is referred to it for more details. While it is
impossible to analytically discern how the equilibrium price compares to the
free trade price, numerical calculations show that aggregate output increases
when the number of US firms is no less than the number of Japanese firms.
The intuition is that this policy scheme creates strategic incentives for the
US firms to expand output and for the Japanese firms to reduce output.
However, with more US firms relative to Japanese firms, the expansion of US
output outweighs the contraction in Japanese output such that prices fall.
Now, we turn to a comparison of the different policies - the subject of the
next section.
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6

Comparison of the subsidy policies

•

Due to tractability problems, we have to rely on numerical simulations for
a comparison of the different targeting schemes. To this end, we consider
an industry comprised of m Japanese firms and n US firms under the restriction that m ~ 10; n ~ 10. We assume a linear inverse demand P =
10 - (2::~1 Xi + 2::j=l Yj) and zero marginal costs of production. The market
access requirement is set at a level 10% greater than the aggregate US market share under free trade. For any given industry configuration, we compute
the subsidy outlay S required to meet the MAR under each of the three subsidy policies, and, pick the policy that entails the least subsidy expenditure.
Then, we examine whether or not the least cost subsidy increases aggregate
output relative to free trade. The results of the simulations are presented in
Figure 8 and Figure 9.
We find that when there are relatively many US firms, then subsidizing
only Japanese firms is the cheapest way to implement the policy and, as
expected, the policy is anticompetitive as the reductions in Japanese output
are less than compensated for by the increases in US output. Why is it
c_heapest to subsidize the Japanese firms in this case? Think of the case
where there are 10 firms in total, nine of which are US firms. In order to
raise their market share by 10%, assuming the output of the Japanese firm is
fixed, each of the nine US firms must increase its output by about .1 units.
But the market share can be met by having the Japanese firm reduce its
output by about the same .1 unit! It is likely to be cheaper to influence the
one Japanese firm than all nine US firms!
When there are relatively many Japanese firms, then for analogous reasons, subsidizing only US firms is the cheapest way to implement the policy
and, as expected, the policy is procompetitive. When there are relatively similar numbers of US and Japanese firms, then subsidizing both is the cheapest
way to implement the policy. In this case, the numbers advantage outlined
above is limited and raising US output a bit as well as reducing Japanese
output a bit is more effective than just doing either. Also, as expected, the
policy is anticompetitive if there are more Japanese firms than US ones and
procompetitive if there are more US firms than Japanese.
•
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7

Conclusion

We show that, contrary to the recent literature, market access requirements
can be implemented in a procompetitive manner if they are properly enforced.
If the least cost policy is to subsidize only Japanese firms, then in order to
meet the market share target

L~l

2:/]=1 Yj
2:
Xi + Lj=l Yj

ex

(10)

aggregate Japanese output, L~l Xi, must decrease. The direct effect of
the reduction in Japanese output outweighs the indirect effect of the corresponding increase in aggregate US output causing the subsidy to be anticompetitive. By similar reasoning, if the least cost policy is to subsidize
only US firms aggregate output will increase relative to free trade output
and the subsidy will be procompetitive. When the least cost policy is to
subsidize both US and Japanese firms then the subsidy is procompetitive if
the number of US firms is no smaller than the number of Japanese firms, but
is anticompetitive otherwise.
Our contribution, therefore, is to show that MARs can be procompetitive
even in the absence of threats in related markets. By focusing on subsidies
that are paid only when the market share target is met, we have shown a
MAR can increase aggregate output relative to free trade provided that the
right set of firms is targeted. Of course, proper targeting is sensitive to the
firm-composition of the industry, bolstering the point emphasized earlier (see
Krishna et al, 1998) that the effects of a MAR depend critically on the way
in which it is implemented.
Finally, while our results for more than two firms are based on numerical
calculations and may not generalize, the results for two firms are robust to
different functional forms or market share targets as long as stability conditions are met. The duopoly results are also robust to the type of competition,
i.e., the contingent subsidy can be shown to lower prices of both goods under
Bertrand competition in a differentiated products duopoly.
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Figure 5. US firm's overall best response (shown in bold) when both firms are targeted for a
market share subsidy.
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Figure 7. Equilibria when both US and Japanese firms are targeted for subsidies.
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